DIV 5023 Module 3 Decision Process Analysis Example

Thirty-One Eligible, Four Considered: Mapping Where Preference Enters a Lead Promotion Process

Student Name

American College of Education

DIV5023: Recognizing and Reducing Favoritism

Module 3 Assignment

Instructor Name

September 18, 2028

Introduction

The first two papers found that lead promotions at the Groveport distribution center favor associates from the promoting manager's former shift and that associates rate the center's procedures as unfair, especially on the overnight shift. This paper examines the lead promotion process in detail. It maps the process step by step as it actually works, uses records of the last nine promotions to show what happens at each step and identifies where personal preference enters. The aim is not to second-guess the people promoted but to find the points a redesign must change.

How the Process Was Mapped

No written procedure exists, so the map was built from evidence. I reviewed email, schedules and human resources records for the nine promotions over three years, interviewed both operations managers, including myself, and four leads about how each promotion happened and compared the associates promoted with those who met basic eligibility at the time. Eligibility was defined using the minimums both managers said they apply: at least twelve months at the center, no safety violations in the past year and productivity and accuracy in the top half of the shift. The process has eight steps.

Steps One and Two: Vacancy and Announcement

A vacancy arises when a lead leaves, is promoted or a new shift area opens. In seven of nine cases, the manager began thinking about candidates before the vacancy was known to associates. A formal posting appeared on the human resources site in only three cases, each time after the manager had already spoken with a preferred candidate. Preference enters here through timing. Associates close to the manager learn of the opening early and can signal interest, while others, especially on the overnight shift, learn of it late or not at all.

Step Three: Forming the Pool

This step narrows the process most. At the most recent opening, 31 associates met the eligibility minimums, including 11 on the overnight shift. The manager considered four, none from the overnight shift. Across all nine promotions, managers considered an average of 2.6 candidates each. Pools were formed from memory rather than from a list, so they were made of people the manager knew and could picture in the role. Research on familiarity and similarity predicts exactly this, and the records show it: of 23 associates considered across the nine decisions, 17 had worked directly for the deciding manager.

Step Four: Informal Recommendations

Managers then asked current leads for views on their candidates. Leads recommended associates they knew, and in interviews two leads said they were sometimes asked about specific people rather than asked whom they would suggest. Recommendations therefore confirmed the manager's pool rather than widening it. Because leads come disproportionately from the day shift, as the first paper showed, their networks reinforce the same narrow pool, and the pattern can repeat itself with each promotion.

Step Five: Defining What Counts

Criteria were never set before candidates were considered. Managers described what made a good lead in general terms, such as being reliable, respected and someone people listen to, and then judged candidates against those descriptions. Rivera (2012), studying hiring at elite professional service firms, found that evaluators often judged candidates on cultural fit and shared experiences such as leisure pursuits, and that this matching shaped who was hired. Loose criteria leave room for the same thing. A candidate who shares a manager's style and interests easily appears reliable and respected.

Step Six: Evaluating Candidates

The center has productivity, accuracy, safety and attendance records for every associate, yet managers consulted them in only four of nine decisions, and then only for the preferred candidate. Castilla (2008), analyzing a large service organization, found that employees with the same performance evaluation scores received different salary increases depending on gender, race and nationality, showing that bias can enter where ratings are turned into rewards. At the center, the risk is similar: even good data can be used selectively, checked to confirm a choice already made rather than to compare candidates.

Step Seven: Deciding

The deciding manager chose alone in all nine cases. No second person reviewed the choice, and no record explained why one candidate was preferred over another. Castilla and Benard (2010) found in experiments that when an organization stressed that it was meritocratic, evaluators actually showed more bias in awarding bonuses, possibly because they felt their fairness was already established. Both managers at the center describe promotion as based purely on merit, and the research suggests this belief, without checks, may make preference harder to notice.

Step Eight: Announcement and Feedback

Each new lead was introduced by name at a shift huddle, with nothing said about how the choice was made. Associates who had been considered were sometimes told privately; associates who had expressed interest but were never considered received no feedback in any case reviewed. This is where the informational justice gap from the second paper arises. It also closes the loop: associates who never learn why they were not chosen cannot improve, and many stop expressing interest, which keeps the next pool just as narrow.

How the Steps Reinforce Each Other

The steps do not act separately. Early information at step one means the manager's preferred candidates have already expressed interest by the time the pool is formed, which makes them seem more motivated than associates who never heard about the opening. Leads recommend people the manager already named, so their views look like independent confirmation. Because criteria are loose, the manager can describe almost any of the familiar candidates as a strong fit, and the selective use of records then confirms the choice. Each step seems reasonable on its own, which is why no one at the center saw a problem. Taken together, they produce a process in which the outcome is largely settled before any comparison takes place.

Summary of Entry Points

Preference enters the process at five points. Timing gives early news to associates close to the manager. Pool formation draws on memory, which favors the familiar. Recommendations from leads reinforce existing networks. Undefined criteria leave room for fit and similarity. And a single decision maker, using data selectively and recording no reasons, faces no check. The final step, missing feedback, sustains the pattern. Of these, pool formation removes the most people from consideration, and undefined criteria shape how the remaining candidates are compared.

What the Map Does Not Show

Mapping has limits. Interviews rely on memory, and both managers may describe their decisions as more deliberate than they were, or less. Nine promotions are a small number, so the counts show a pattern rather than proving one. The map also cannot say whether a different process would have chosen different leads; some of the nine might well have been chosen by any fair method. What it can show is that many eligible associates were never compared at all, which is the main thing a redesign can fix.

Conclusion

Mapping the lead promotion process shows that personal preference enters mostly before candidates are compared: through early information, pools formed from memory, recommendations from the same networks and criteria defined loosely after candidates are known. Research on cultural matching, the use of evaluations and the paradox of meritocracy explains why each of these steps invites bias. With 31 associates eligible and four considered at the last opening, the next paper redesigns the process with structured, transparent steps.

References

Castilla, E. J. (2008). Gender, race, and meritocracy in organizational careers. American Journal of Sociology, 113(6), 1479-1526. https://doi.org/10.1086/588738

Castilla, E. J., & Benard, S. (2010). The paradox of meritocracy in organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(4), 543-576. https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.2010.55.4.543

Rivera, L. A. (2012). Hiring as cultural matching: The case of elite professional service firms. American Sociological Review, 77(6), 999-1022. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122412463213