BUS 6553 Module 4 Succession Planning and Leadership Pipeline Analysis Example

The Bench Looks Like the Board: Succession Planning and the Leadership Pipeline at an Engineering Firm

Student Name

American College of Education

BUS6553: Leveling the Playing Field in Talent Management

Module 4 Assignment

Instructor Name

February 25, 2030

Introduction

The two previous papers found that bias enters Piedmont Civil Group's talent decisions at hiring and at promotion, through discretionary screening, fit-based interviews, undefined potential ratings and informal project assignments. Succession planning sits at the end of this chain, determining who will hold the firm's senior roles. If the earlier stages narrow opportunity, succession will reflect that narrowing. This paper examines how Piedmont identifies successors for its leadership roles, measures who is in the pipeline, compares building leaders internally with hiring them from outside and draws on research to identify where the pipeline should be changed.

How Succession Works Now

Piedmont maintains a succession list for 31 leadership roles, from department heads to the chief operating officer. Each year, the executive team names one to three ready-now and ready-later successors for each role. There are no written criteria. Executives draw on potential ratings, their own experience working with candidates and recommendations from department leaders. The list is confidential, and candidates are not told they are on it. Development for named successors is informal: executives invite them to client meetings, assign them to visible projects and sponsor them for external programs.

Who Is on the Bench

Of 58 names on the current succession list, 9 are women and 5 are people of color, compared with 27 percent women and 24 percent people of color among project managers, the pool from which most successors are drawn. The narrowing is sharper for ready-now successors, of whom 2 of 21 are women. Most named successors had worked directly for at least one executive at some point. In effect, the list reflects who the executive team knows well, which in turn reflects the earlier patterns of assignment and potential ratings.

A Note on Ready-Later Successors

Ready-later successors deserve attention because they show who is being prepared for the future. On Piedmont's list, ready-later names were somewhat more varied than ready-now names, with 7 women among 37. This suggests some broadening is under way, but without criteria and development plans, ready-later status may not lead anywhere. Tracking how many ready-later successors become ready-now within three years, by group, would show whether the pipeline is truly widening.

Following the Pipeline Backward

Tracing named successors backward shows how earlier stages feed the list. Nearly all had received high potential ratings early in their careers and had led at least one large, visible project within five years of hire. As the previous paper showed, those assignments and ratings are made informally and favor engineers whom leaders already know. Succession planning therefore does not create the narrowing so much as inherit and confirm it. A fair succession process must reach back to the inputs, not only change how the final list is assembled.

What Executives Said

Interviews with five executives showed sincere interest in a broader bench and uncertainty about how to achieve it. Most said they named successors they had seen perform under pressure, which usually meant people who had worked for them. Two said they rarely met engineers outside their own departments. One suggested rotating high performers through executive meetings. Their responses suggest the narrowing reflects limited exposure more than reluctance, which makes structural remedies promising.

Structure and Accountability

Research on personnel systems helps explain the pattern. Dobbin et al. (2015) analyzed data from hundreds of U.S. firms over three decades and found that formal personnel practices had varied effects on diversity: practices that limited managerial discretion without engaging managers sometimes produced resistance, while practices that engaged managers in solving the problem, such as mentoring programs and diversity task forces, were followed by gains in management diversity. Kalev et al. (2006) similarly found that assigning responsibility for progress was associated with increases in diversity in management. Piedmont's succession process has neither clear criteria nor anyone responsible for the breadth of the pipeline.

Sponsorship and Mentoring

The informal development that named successors receive amounts to sponsorship: executives use their influence to open doors. Sponsorship is powerful but unevenly distributed, because executives sponsor people they know. Formal mentoring can broaden access. Eby et al. (2008) found in a meta-analysis that mentoring was associated with favorable career and attitudinal outcomes, though effects were modest. Mentoring programs that pair high-performing engineers outside executives' networks with senior leaders could widen the circle of people executives know well enough to sponsor.

Build or Buy?

When the internal bench is thin for a role, Piedmont often hires externally. In the past five years, 9 of 22 leadership vacancies were filled from outside. External hiring can bring in new perspectives, but it has costs. Bidwell (2011) studied an investment banking firm and compared people brought in from outside with colleagues promoted into similar jobs and found that the newcomers earned more yet were rated less favorably at first and quit more often. For Piedmont, relying on external hiring when the internal bench is narrow is both costly and a missed opportunity to develop engineers already in the firm.

The Cost of a Narrow Bench

A narrow bench also carries business risk. When several ready-now successors share similar backgrounds and have worked for the same executives, the firm's future leaders may share the same blind spots. Clients in the region are increasingly public agencies and developers with diverse leadership, and several have asked about Piedmont's own leadership. A broader bench would give the firm more options when vacancies arise and reduce its reliance on costly external searches.

Transparency Questions

The confidentiality of the list deserves examination. Leaders argue that secrecy prevents disappointment and departures among those not named. But secrecy also means that capable engineers do not know what is expected to be considered and cannot seek the experiences that lead to selection. A more transparent approach would publish the criteria and development paths for leadership roles, while keeping individual assessments private. Engineers could then pursue the required experiences, and the firm could see who is preparing.

Pipeline Points for Redesign

The analysis identifies five pipeline points that the final module's design must address. First, written criteria for succession, tied to the competencies each role requires. Second, a defined potential rating, or replacement of potential with assessed readiness on specific competencies. Third, a transparent process for assigning large projects, so visibility is not distributed by acquaintance. Fourth, structured mentoring that connects engineers outside executive networks with senior leaders. Fifth, a named executive responsible for the breadth of the pipeline, with regular review of who is being developed.

Limitations

The analysis relies on a small number of leadership roles and named successors, so percentages can shift with a few individuals. Succession decisions involve judgments about readiness that data cannot fully capture. And the research cited comes from different industries and periods. For that reason the results should prompt structural fixes and ongoing tracking, not be read as exact measures of bias.

Conclusion

Piedmont's succession list reflects whom executives know, and whom they know reflects informal assignments and undefined potential ratings earlier in careers. Women and people of color are underrepresented on the bench relative to the eligible pool, especially among ready-now successors. Research on personnel structures, accountability, mentoring and external hiring explains the pattern and its costs. Five pipeline points, from criteria to accountability, define what the final module's evidence-based talent practice must change.

References

Bidwell, M. (2011). Paying more to get less: The effects of external hiring versus internal mobility. Administrative Science Quarterly, 56(3), 369-407. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839211433562

Dobbin, F., Schrage, D., & Kalev, A. (2015). Rage against the iron cage: The varied effects of bureaucratic personnel reforms on diversity. American Sociological Review, 80(5), 1014-1044. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122415596416

Eby, L. T., Allen, T. D., Evans, S. C., Ng, T., & DuBois, D. L. (2008). Does mentoring matter? A multidisciplinary meta-analysis comparing mentored and non-mentored individuals. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 72(2), 254-267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvb.2007.04.005

Kalev, A., Dobbin, F., & Kelly, E. (2006). Best practices or best guesses? Assessing the efficacy of corporate affirmative action and diversity policies. American Sociological Review, 71(4), 589-617. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240607100404