| Course | BUS 6583 Systems Thinking for Business Optimization |
|---|---|
| Module | Module 2 |
| Paper type | Unintended consequences analysis |
| Length | 1,200 words, about 4 pages plus title and reference pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | American College of Education |
| Program | Doctor of Business Administration |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for BUS 6583 Module 2
Paid by the Job: Tracing the Unintended Consequences of a Flat-Rate Pay Decision Through an HVAC Company's System
Student Name
American College of Education
BUS6583: Systems Thinking for Business Optimization
Module 2 Assignment
Instructor Name
October 28, 2030
Introduction
Module 1 laid out Desert Comfort Services, a composite Phoenix heating and cooling company, as a system of five feedback loops linking summer demand, overtime, burnout, training, callbacks and customer loss. This paper uses that map to trace the consequences of a decision made in early 2027, when the company moved its technicians from hourly pay to flat-rate pay, a fixed amount for each completed job based on a standard time. The change aimed to raise productivity. It did, at first. This paper follows its effects through the system, explains why they occurred and draws lessons for designing decisions in interconnected organizations.
The Decision and Its Logic
Before 2027, technicians earned hourly wages plus overtime. Managers believed some technicians worked slowly, especially in milder months, and that hourly pay gave no reason to finish more jobs. Flat-rate pay, common in the industry, pays each job at a set rate whether it takes more or less time than the standard. The intended effect was simple: technicians who worked efficiently would earn more and complete more jobs, reducing backlog without adding staff. In the language of the system map, the decision aimed to raise capacity and weaken the overtime and burnout loop.
The Intended Effect Arrived
Dispatch records show that completed jobs per technician per day rose about 12 percent in the first six months after the change, and average backlog in spring 2027 was lower than in the previous spring. Technicians who were already fast earned more, and some reported satisfaction with the new system. Viewed narrowly, the decision succeeded. Had leaders evaluated it at six months on jobs per day alone, they would have judged it a clear improvement.
Consequence One: Callbacks Rose
By summer 2027, callbacks had risen from about 6 percent of jobs to 13 percent, compared with 11 percent the previous July. Under flat-rate pay, a technician earns nothing extra for the time spent testing a repair thoroughly or explaining maintenance to a customer, but earns a full rate for the next job. Callbacks are usually assigned to whichever technician is available, so the original technician bears little cost for an incomplete repair. Through the rushed work loop, each callback consumed capacity without revenue, offsetting a large part of the productivity gain.
Consequence Two: Complex Jobs Avoided
Flat rates are set from standard times, and some job types, such as diagnosing intermittent electrical faults in older systems, routinely take longer than their standard. Technicians learned which jobs paid poorly for the time required and, where dispatch allowed, avoided them by declining add-on assignments or ending their day early. Complex jobs accumulated and were left to a smaller group of senior technicians, increasing their overtime and fatigue and strengthening the burnout loop for exactly the people the company could least afford to lose.
Consequence Three: Training Declined
The most delayed consequence fell on training. Under hourly pay, senior technicians were paid the same whether or not a trainee rode along. Under flat-rate pay, a ride-along slowed them down and cost them money. HR records show that the number of senior technicians volunteering as trainers fell by almost half in 2027, and trainee dropouts rose. With the nine-month training delay, the effect appeared in 2028, when the company entered summer with about 70 fewer experienced technicians than planned, intensifying every loop in the map.
Consequence Four: Customer Complaints
Customers noticed. Complaints about technicians seeming rushed or recommending replacements rather than repairs rose, and maintenance plan cancellations after the 2027 summer were higher than after any of the three prior summers. Through the customer loss loop, fewer plan customers meant less off-season work, weaker spring revenue and cautious hiring, so the company began summer 2028 with both fewer technicians and a thinner base of loyal customers.
Paying for Volume, Hoping for Quality
Kerr (1975) cataloged cases in which a reward system pays for one kind of conduct while managers wish for something else, and noted their surprise when people deliver exactly what is paid for. Desert Comfort hoped for efficient, high-quality work and for senior technicians to develop the next generation, but it rewarded the number of jobs completed. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) showed formally that when a job involves several tasks and only some can be measured, strong incentives on the measured tasks draw effort away from the unmeasured ones. Quality, complex diagnosis and training were the unmeasured tasks here, and they suffered.
A Fix That Failed
Senge (1990) described a recurring structure called fixes that fail, in which a solution relieves a symptom in the short term but sets off consequences that, after a delay, make the problem worse. The flat-rate decision fits this archetype. Productivity, the symptom, improved quickly. Callbacks, avoided complex work, lost training and customer losses, the side effects, arrived over months and fed back into the backlog and shortage the fix was meant to cure. Because the side effects were delayed and spread across different departments, no single report connected them to the pay change.
Why Leaders Missed It
Three features of the system hid the consequences. The benefits appeared in the measure leaders watched most closely, jobs per day, while the costs appeared in measures owned by others: quality in field supervision, training in HR and cancellations in sales. The most serious effect, on training, appeared with a nine-month delay. And because summer always brought trouble, leaders attributed 2028's shortage to the labor market. Gibbons (1998) noted that incentive systems often produce dysfunctional responses that are visible only when the full set of employee behaviors is considered, which requires looking beyond the target metric.
Lessons for Decision Design
Four lessons follow. First, before changing an incentive, trace its likely effects through every loop in the system map, not only the loop it is meant to affect. Second, identify tasks that the new incentive will not measure, such as quality and training, and protect them with separate rewards or rules. Third, monitor the side-effect measures, callbacks, trainer participation and cancellations, alongside the target measure. Fourth, evaluate a decision over a period longer than its slowest delay, here at least a year.
What a Better Design Would Have Looked Like
With the system map in hand, a better design is visible. The company could have paid a flat rate adjusted for job complexity, docked or reassigned callbacks to the original technician, paid trainers a separate stipend for ride-alongs and protected time for complex diagnosis. Each element addresses one consequence traced above. Such hybrid plans are more complex to administer, but their cost is far smaller than the capacity lost in 2027 and 2028.
Conclusion
The move to flat-rate pay raised jobs per technician by about 12 percent but set off consequences through the system: callbacks more than doubled, complex jobs shifted onto overtaxed seniors, trainers withdrew and trainees dropped out, and customers canceled more maintenance plans. Multitask incentive theory and the folly of rewarding one thing while hoping for another explain the pattern, and the fixes-that-fail archetype describes its structure. The next module will apply a systems archetype to the company's recurring summer crisis.
References
Gibbons, R. (1998). Incentives in organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), 115-132. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.12.4.115
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 7(Special issue), 24-52. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management Journal, 18(4), 769-783. https://doi.org/10.2307/255378
Senge, P. M. (1990). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization. Doubleday.
Reading the BUS 6583 Module 2 instructions
The second BUS 6583 paper often asks you to trace the unintended consequences of a past decision. Choose a decision whose effects you can document, state what it was meant to achieve and then follow its effects through each loop of your system map, using data to show when and where they appeared. Most prompts reward explaining the consequences with theory, such as incentive theory or systems archetypes, and asking why decision makers did not see them. Pay attention to delays and to effects that appeared in other departments' measures. End with lessons for designing future decisions, and cite systems and management research in APA 7. Compare measures with the same period in earlier years so that seasonal patterns are not mistaken for effects of the decision.
How the BUS 6583 Module 2 example is put together
The sample describes the switch to flat-rate pay and its intended effect on capacity, then shows that jobs per day rose 12 percent. Four consequences are traced through the system map with records: callbacks rising to 13 percent, complex jobs shifted to overworked seniors, trainer volunteers falling by almost half and trainee shortfalls a year later, and higher cancellations. Kerr and multitask agency theory explain the incentive problem, and the fixes-that-fail archetype describes the structure. A section on why leaders missed the effects points to scattered measures and delays, and four design lessons close the paper. Each consequence is dated so the reader can see the delays the paper discusses.
Where the points sit in the BUS 6583 Module 2 rubric
Unintended consequence analyses are judged on tracing, evidence and explanation. Graders want the decision and its intent stated plainly, effects followed through the system with data and timing and theory used to explain why the effects occurred. Strong papers show how delays and scattered measures hid the consequences and turn the analysis into practical design lessons. Weaker papers list side effects without connecting them to the system, rely on hindsight blame or omit evidence of timing. A diagram showing where each consequence entered the loops is helpful, and every theory should be cited from its source. Fair treatment of the original decision makers adds credibility. Graders appreciate lessons that could be applied before the next decision.
Common BUS 6583 Module 2 mistakes, and how to avoid them
Tracing consequences through a system needs both a good map and careful evidence. We can help you choose a past decision, follow its effects through your causal loops, gather data on timing and explain the results with systems archetypes or incentive theory. Share the assignment and your first module's map, and the analysis will connect each consequence to the structure that produced it. Pay changes, cost cuts, new technology and policy changes all work. Delivery normally takes about three days, with an annotated diagram of the consequences. A short presentation version for colleagues can be added. Annotated loop diagrams are included.
Write yours, or have the desk draft it
This paper is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official American College of Education document. Read it for the moves, then write your own to the instructions in your classroom. If you want one built to your exact prompt and rubric, the first custom sample is free and arrives in 24 to 48 hours.
More BUS 6583 and Doctor of Business Administration sample papers
- BUS 6583 Module 1: Causal Loop System Map
- BUS 6583 Module 3: Systems Archetype Application
- BUS 6583 Module 4: Future Scenarios
- BUS 6583 Module 5: Socio-Technical Strategy
- BUS 6563 Module 5: Transformation Strategy
- BUS 6533 Module 3: Engagement Measurement Study
- BUS 6573 Module 4: Financial Decision Ethics
- BUS 6573 Module 2: Capital Budgeting Model
BUS 6583 Module 2 questions, answered
What does BUS6583 Module 2 usually ask for?
The second BUS6583 module often asks you to trace the unintended consequences of a past decision through your organization's system.
What is the fixes that fail archetype?
A pattern Senge described in which a quick fix relieves a symptom but triggers delayed side effects that make the original problem worse.
Why do incentives backfire in multitask jobs?
When only some tasks are measured and rewarded, effort shifts toward them and away from unmeasured tasks such as quality or training.
Where can I find a free BUS 6583 Module 2 sample paper?
This page has one: the unintended consequences of switching HVAC technicians to flat-rate pay, traced through a system map.
How long should I wait before judging a decision?
At least as long as the slowest delay in the system; here training effects took about nine months to appear.